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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ, : Case No. 20060737-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2006), possession 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2)(b) (West 2004), and possession of paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance in not challenging the weapons 
frisk of defendant's person where Trooper Vasquez saw two large knives—a 
switchblade and double-bladed combat knife—in plain view inside defendant's 
vehicle during the traffic stop? 
"When a question of trial counsel ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on 
appeal and the review is confined to the trial court record, the question of ineffectiveness 
of counsel is a matter of law, to be reviewed for correctness." State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 
550, 554 (Utah App. 1993). "[DJefendant bears the burden of assuring the record is 
adequate" to review his claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 16, 
12P.3d92. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third degree 
felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. Rl. 
Conviction. Defendant was convicted as charged. R52-53, R96:82, 104. 
Sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to zero to five years on each of the 
two felony counts and six months on the misdemeanor count, all to run concurrently with 
each other and with a sentence in another case. R55-56. 
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R64. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
During a traffic stop, Trooper Vasquez saw two large knives—a switchblade and a 
double-bladed combat knife—in plain view inside defendant's vehicle. A weapons frisk 
of defendant's person and vehicle additionally yielded drugs and paraphernalia. 
* * * 
At about 10:14 p.m. on 14 July 2006, Trooper Vasquez pulled defendant over for 
having a broken tail light. R96:43-44. Trooper Vasquez walked up to defendant's 
window to ask for defendant's license and registration. Id. at 44-45. When defendant 
rolled his window down, Trooper Vasquez saw a switchblade on the passenger seat. Id. 
at 45. When defendant leaned over to retrieve his registration and insurance inforaiation, 
Trooper Vasquez noticed another metal object "tucked underneath [defendant's] right 
thigh"; "it appeared to be some kind of knife." R96:45-46. Trooper Vasquez asked 
defendant to exit the car "to separate [defendant] from the weapons . . . for [Trooper 
Vasquez's] safety." Id. at 46. 
Defendant got out of his car with his wallet still in his hand. Id. Trooper Vasquez 
had defendant put his wallet on the trunk of the car rather than back in his pocket, where 
he could potentially reach a weapon. Id. Trooper Vasquez then frisked defendant for 
other weapons. Id. at 46-47. He felt a "hard metal object" which was "consistent with a 
]The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
3 
metal pipe, . . . commonly used to smoke marijuana," in defendant's right front pocket. 
Id. at 47-48. Trooper Vasquez asked defendant what the metal object was; defendant said 
it was a pipe. Id. at 48. Trooper Vasquez then asked "[a] pipe to smoke what?" Id. at 48. 
Such pipes could be used to smoke tobacco. Id. at 57. Defendant replied that his pipe 
was for smoking "weed," or marijuana, and that he had used it that afternoon. Id. at 48, 
50. Trooper Vasquez continued to frisk defendant for weapons. Id. at 48. He then 
handcuffed defendant, and gave him & Miranda warning.2 Id. at 48-49, 50-51. Trooper 
Vasquez then pulled the marijuana pipe from defendant's pocket. Id. at 48. The pipe 
contained residue consistent with burnt marijuana. Id. at 48-50. 
Trooper Vasquez placed defendant in the back seat of his patrol car and searched 
defendant's car. Id. at 49. He found a black bag with a glass pipe in the glove 
compartment. Id. The glass pipe had white burn marks on it consistent with 
methamphetamine. Id. Trooper Vasquez also searched defendant's wallet, finding a pack 
of rolling papers commonly used for marijuana, as well as "two small baggies with a 
white crystal substance," or methamphetamine. Id. at 49, 74. Defendant admitted that the 
residue on the pipe would test positive for methamphetamine. Id. at 50-51. Trooper 
Vasquez then retrieved the knives: a "large switchblade" and "some kind of a combat 
knife" with "two large blades." Id. at 50-51. 
2See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the 
weapons frisk fails as a matter of law because defendant asserts that the record is 
inadequate to determine the propriety of the trial court's admissibility ruling. As 
appellant, defendant carries the burden of assuring that the record is adequate to support 
his claim of ineffectiveness. Where, as defendant here asserts, the record is inadequate, 
this Court has no choice but to presume that trial counsel acted effectively. 
In any event, contrary to defendant's assertion, the record is more than adequate to 
determine that any challenge to the weapons frisk would have been futile. This is because 
Trooper Vasquez observed two large knives—a switchblade and a double-bladed combat 
knife—inside defendant's vehicle during the traffic stop. After seeing these knives, any 
objectively reasonable person would have suspected that defendant may be armed and 
dangerous. Case and statutory law authorize a weapons frisk of a suspect's person and 
vehicle under these circumstances. 
Finally, defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly failing to 
review the videotape of the traffic stop prior to trial is a rehashing of his unsuccessful 
motion to remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because the Court 
denied defendant's rule 23B motion, the record on appeal remains devoid of non-
speculative evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for allegedly not examining the 
videotape of the traffic stop. Absent any evidence that the videotape was 
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exculpatory—which defendant acknowledges is unlikely—and that trial counsel did not 
examine it, this Court must presume that trial counsel acted effectively. 
ARGUMENT 
TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE IN NOT CHALLENGING THE WEAPONS FRISK 
WHERE TROOPER VASQUEZ SAW TWO LARGE KNIVES—A 
SWITCHBLADE AND A DOUBLE-BLADED COMBAT KNIFE—IN 
PLAIN VIEW INSIDE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE DURING THE 
TRAFFIC STOP 
In Point I of his brief, defendant asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel because he did not challenge the weapons frisk that yielded, among 
other things, defendant's incriminating admission that he used the metal pipe found on his 
person to smoke "weed." Aplt. Br. at 4 ('The warrantless 'weapons' search of 
[defendant] was improper because Trooper Vasquez did not reasonably suspect that 
[defendant] was armed or presently dangerous" (underlining omitted)); see also id. at 7 
("[Defendant's pre-Miranda confession that he possessed marijuana par[a]phernalia was 
a result of the illegal frisk and should be suppressed" (underlining omitted)). In so doing, 
defendant asserts that the "record is inadequate to fully determine whether suppression 
[was] appropriate." Aplt. Br. at 7. Nevertheless, defendant maintains that "the record 
does adequately demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective." Id. Defendant's 
conflicting characterizations of the record undercut his claim of ineffectiveness. In any 
event, contrary to defendant's assertion, the record is adequate to determine that the 
weapons frisk was justified and, therefore, that any motion to suppress the fruits thereof 
would have been futile. This Court may reject defendant's claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on either of these two grounds. 
A. Defendant's assertion that the "record is inadequate to 
fully determine whether suppression [was] appropriate," 
defeats his claim of ineffectiveness. 
As noted above, defendant asserts that the record is "inadequate to fully determine 
whether suppression is appropriate." Aplt. Br. at 7. In so asserting, defendant necessarily 
acknowledges that he cannot rebut the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered 
effective assistance. His claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should therefore be 
rejected. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel defendant must establish that (1) 
trial counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced 
his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To satisfy the first prong 
of the Strickland test, defendant must demonstrate that counsel's "representation fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To do so, 
defendant must "rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, TJ19, 12 P.3d 92 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In other words, 
defendant must demonstrate "that there was a Tack of any conceivable tactical basis' for 
counsel's actions." State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting 
State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1992)). Defendant must identify 
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counsel's specific acts or omissions that "fall outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance." State v. Classon, 935 P.2d 524, 532 (Utah App. 1997) (citations 
omitted and internal quotation marks omitted). "'Proof of ineffective assistance of 
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.5" State v. 
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 
870, 877 (Utah 1993)). 
To meet his burden under the second, prejudice prong of the Strickland test, 
defendant must show that he was actually harmed by any alleged deficiencies. To meet 
this criterion, defendant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but 
for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694; State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993). The Supreme Court 
has defined a reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 
in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
Based on the above, before defendant may be granted relief on his claim that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the weapons frisk he must do more than 
simply assert that the weapons frisk may have been illegal. See Aplt. Br. at 7 ("The 
record is inadequate to fully determine whether suppression is appropriate"). He must 
show that the frisk was illegal, andihsX he was prejudiced by the admission of the 
evidence obtained thereby. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694. But defendant merely 
asserts that the record is inadequate to determine whether suppression, rather than 
8 
admission, of the evidence was appropriate. Aplt. Br. at 7. This assertion necessarily 
undermines defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Litherland, 2000 
UT 76, \ 17. When, as defendant asserts, the record is "inadequate in any fashion, 
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a 
finding that counsel performed effectively." Id. As recognized in Litherland, "[t]his 
presumption is consistent with the fundamental policies dictated by Strickland, and with 
the general rule that record inadequacies result in an assumption of regularity on appeal. 
Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the instant record must be construed in favor of a 
finding that counsel performed effectively. 
B. Contrary to defendant's claim, the record is adequate to 
demonstrate that any motion to suppress the fruits of the 
weapons frisk would have been futile. 
In any event, contrary to defendant's claims, the record is adequate to demonstrate 
that any challenge to the weapons frisk would have been futile. Defendant's claim of 
ineffectiveness therefore lacks merit and may be rejected on this additional ground. 
Although defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging 
the weapons frisk, he acknowledges that Trooper Vasquez saw two knives inside his 
vehicle during the traffic stop, and further acknowledges that this "fact tend[ed] to justify 
[Trooper] Vasquez's [weapons] frisk." Aplt. Br. at 6. Defendant is correct. As will be 
shown below, the weapons frisk was justified because after seeing large switchblade and 
double-bladed combat knives in plain view inside defendant's vehicle, any objectively 
9 
reasonable person would have suspected that defendant was armed and dangerous. 
Accordingly, any challenge to the weapons frisk would have been futile and trial 
counsel's failure to do so cannot, therefore, serve as the basis for any claim of ineffective 
assistance.3 
Both statutory and case law make clear that an officer may conduct a weapons 
frisk of an individual if the officer reasonably believes that he or anyone else is in danger. 
See State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, Tf 14, 78 P.3d 590 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
3It is not entirely clear from defendant's brief if he is challenging any evidence 
other than his incriminating statement that he used the metal pipe found on his person to 
smoke "weed." See Aplt. Br. at 4-7. At trial, defendant moved to suppress this statement 
as having been obtained in violation of Miranda. R96:5. The prosecutor objected that 
the motion was untimely and the trial court agreed, but also ruled in the alternative, that 
defendant's statement was not the product of interrogation. R96:5,14-15. 
If defendant's brief is reasonably read to suggest that he is only challenging the 
admission of his incriminating statement, his claim of ineffectiveness necessarily fails on 
the ground that he has not, and cannot, establish prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
697 (holding that "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim" for lack of 
prejudice, "[this] course should be followed"). This is because defendant's statement was 
merely cumulative evidence supporting the paraphernalia charge. The State also 
presented the marijuana pipe, a methamphetamine pipe, rolling papers, and plastic bindles 
containing methamphetamine. See R96:51-52. Any one of these is sufficient to uphold 
defendant's paraphernalia conviction. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004) ("It 
is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to . . 
. store, conceal, . . . inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human 
body"). Defendant's incriminating statement was superfluous to the paraphernalia 
charge; therefore, he cannot show a "reasonable probability that" if counsel had timely 
filed a successful suppression motion, "the result of the proceeding would have been 
different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
In any event, as will be shown in the body of this brief, any challenge to the 
weapons frisk—or any of its fruits—would have been futile because it was eminently 
justified by the trooper's observation of two large knives inside defendant's vehicle 
during the traffic stop. 
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21-22 (1968)); State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-
16 (West 2004). "The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; 
the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in 
the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; accord 
State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah 1986). The officer's reasonable belief must, of 
course, be supported by "specific and articulable facts" as well as the "rational 
inferences" that may be drawn from those facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. Police may "draw 
upon their own experience and training to make determinations based on the cumulative 
facts before them that may elude an untrained person." Warren, 2003 UT 36, f 14 (citing 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). An officer's subjective interpretation 
of the facts, or subjective belief, "is one of several possible articulable facts a court may 
consider as part of the totality of the circumstances." Id. at If 21. Finally, "[c]ourts must 
view the articulable facts in their totality and avoid the temptation to divide the facts and 
evaluate them in isolation from each other." Id. at [^ 14 (citing Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274). 
Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the inherent 
dangerousness of traffic stops, the facts that Trooper Vasquez was working alone, and 
that the stop occurred after 10:00 p.m. rather than in the light of day, and most 
particularly, the fact that Trooper Vasquez observed two large knives—a switchblade and 
a double-bladed combat knife—inside defendant's vehicle, the weapons frisk was 
justified by reasonable safety concerns. See R96:43-44, 50-51, 58. Indeed, the 
11 
observation of knives within a driver's reach allows not only for a weapons frisk of the 
driver's person, but a protective search of the area of his immediate control. Cf. 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 & n.15 (1983) (upholding protective search 
of Long's car, and by implication prior frisk of his person, incident to DUI investigation, 
because it was late at night in a rural area and a hunting knife had been seen on the floor 
of the car). Trooper Vasquez could have reasonably believed that defendant had other 
weapons on his person or inside his vehicle, and was therefore justified in performing a 
weapons frisk. 
Indeed, the trooper's observation of the knives in this case alone distinguishes the 
result in Warren, where the supreme court declined to uphold a weapons frisk, in part, 
because the officer in that case testified that Warren "did nothing to cause [him] to be 
alarmed and that he had no reason to believe that Warren was armed and dangerous." 
2003 UT 36, ^ 32. Significantly, the officer in Warren observed no weapons upon 
approaching Warren, or at any time during the traffic stop. Id. at ^[ 2-7. Thus, in 
declining to uphold the weapons frisk in Warren, the supreme court recognized that "the 
case was a difficult one," in part, because it "lack[ed] the kind of obvious articulable facts 
that would make the determination easier. Id. at |^ 30, 33. Given the large switchblade 
and double-bladed combat knives Trooper Vasquez saw inside defendant's vehicle, this 
case, unlike Warren does not lack the obvious articulable facts that make the 
determination easier. Id. at \ 3. 
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Notwithstanding the above, defendant maintains that trial counsel was ineffective 
for not challenging the weapons frisk here at issue for essentially five overlapping 
reasons: (1) Trooper Vasquez "had no historical contact with [defendant] to raise any 
concerns that [defendant] might be a risk," (2) the trooper "had no information about 
whether [defendant] had a criminal history," (3) "[defendant] also appear[ed] to have 
been fully compliant throughout the encounter," (4) "[defendant] did not act aggressively 
or make any furtive movement that was consistent with aggression or with retrieving a 
weapon," and (5) knives are not presumptively dangerous weapons. Aplt. Br. at 6, 8. 
According to defendant, trial counsel should have argued these points in the trial court 
and because he did not, "Trooper Vaszquez was never adequately questioned about his 
concerns for officer safety or cross-examined to determine whether those concerns were 
reasonable under the circumstances." Aplt. Br. at 7.4 
Defendant's assertions miss the point. As set forth above, it is well established 
that the reasonableness of police conduct is judged against an objective standard. See 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22; Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978). Under this 
standard, the weapons frisk was justified so "long as the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justified [it]." See Devenpeckv. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (holding 
4Although defendant challenges the justification for the weapons frisk of his 
person, he does not claim that any illegality occurred after Trooper Vasquez felt the "hard 
metal object" that the trooper described as being "consistent with a metal pipe, . . . 
commonly used to smoke marijuana," in defendant's right front pocket. R96:47-48. See 
Aplt. Br. at 7-8. 
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that the officer's "state of mind . . . does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action"); accordBrigham City v. Stuart, 
126 S.Ct 1943, 1948 (2006) (same); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) 
(same); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that "it is of no 
moment that [the officer] . . . did not himself suspect that respondent was armed"). An 
officer's motive for acting is irrelevant. See Scott, 436 U.S. at 138 (holding searches are 
examined "without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers 
involved"). Given the presence of the large switchblade and double-bladed combat 
knives inside defendant's vehicle, the instant weapons frisk was objectively reasonable 
regardless of whether defendant (1) had a criminal history, (2) was cooperative, and (3) 
the knives could have possibly been put to legitimate, non-dangerous uses.5 See Warren, 
2003 UT 36, Tf 14 (holding that reasonableness is determined by asking whether the facts 
5Defendant acknowledges that trial counsel adduced evidence through cross-
examination of a law enforcement witness that the knives could have been used to cut 
shingles and open boxes, Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing R96:69-70), but complains that this 
evidence should have been presented though calling defense witnesses. Aplt. Br. at 9. 
Regardless of whether the potential non-dangerous uses for defendant's large knives 
came from law enforcement or defense witnesses, however, the knives themselves would 
still be in evidence. R96:51. The trial court could reasonably base a finding of 
dangerousness on its observation of the large knives alone. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
10-50l(5)(a) (West 2004) (setting forth factors for determining whether an object is 
dangerous including the character of the object, the character of any wound, the manner 
in which the object was used, and other lawful purposes for the object's use); see also 
State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 273-74 (Utah App. 1995) (affirming trial court 
determination that knife with four and one-half inch blade was a "dangerous weapon"); 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 929 (Utah App. 1991) (affirming trial court 
determination that two knives with "5 to 6 inch blades" were "dangerous weapons"). 
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available at the time of the search would '""warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief that the action taken was appropriate'") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22)); see 
also State v. Karsten, 2005 UT App 549 (unpublished) (upholding weapons frisk 
conducted incident to traffic stop where officer observed two knifes in Karsten's vehicle 
and suspected a third weapon may be hidden in one of Karsten's pockets). This would be 
true, moreover, even if trial counsel had successfully elicited testimony from Trooper 
Vasquez that he was not subjectively concerned for his safety after seeing the knives or 
during the traffic stop. See Warren, 2003 UT 36, Tf 19 (holding that "an officer's lack of 
subjective belief alone does not invalidate an otherwise objectively reasonable Terry 
frisk"). Here, however, it happens that Trooper Vasquez was concerned for his safety 
after discovering the knives. See R96:58 ("It appeared to be a knife. I wasn't for certain, 
but it made me a little—being out on the road on the highway by yourself, you're a little 
cautious to what's on the road. With it being a metal object, it appeared to be a knife, but 
I couldn't say 100 percent sure it was a knife. I believed it to be some kind of a weapon 
of sort"). 
Based on the above, it is clear that any challenge to the weapons frisk would have 
had no chance of success. Because the weapons frisk was objectively justified, any 
motion to suppress its fruits would have been futile and trial counsel cannot be faulted for 
not filing a frivolous suppression motion. See, e.g., Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 
525 (Utah 1994) ("The failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be 
15 
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance'") (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 
660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983)); see also State v. Messer, 2007 UT App 166,123, 578 
Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (same). 
C. Defendant's claim that trial counsel failed to properly 
investigate because he allegedly failed to examine a 
videotape of the traffic stop is unsupported by record facts 
Finally, defendant additionally asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because he 
allegedly failed to review a videotape of the traffic stop, a videotape defendant describes 
as "perhaps not exculpatory." Aplt. Br. at 10. In support of his claim, defendant rehashes 
his failed motion for remand under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See, 
e.g., Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing "(R.55), Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey (in support of Rule 23B 
Motion)5').6 See also Rule 23B Motion, Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey, and Rule 23B 
Order (unsigned) (copies are attached in addendum A). Although unacknowledged by 
defendant, this Court denied his rule 23B motion. See Order Denying Remand dated 22 
March 2007 (a copy is attached in addendum B). This Court's ruling notwithstanding, 
defendant does not hesitate to ask that the Court accept as substantive evidence, the very 
extra-record allegations the Court has already rejected as mere speculation. See Order, 
6The Bailey affidavit was filed in support of defendant's Rule 23B Motion, a copy 
of which is contained in addendum A. Although defendant represents that the affidavit 
appears at page 55 of the record, it does not appear in the record on appeal. Rather, the 
document numbered in the record at R55 is the "Judgment and Commitment to State 
Prison." See id. Defendant likely intended to cite a page of the trial transcript: At 
R96:55, Trooper Vasquez testifies that he reviewed the videotape of the traffic stop in 
preparation for trial. 
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addendum B. Defendant's reliance on these extra-record allegations is improper and 
should therefore be rejected. See State v. Bredehoft, 966 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah App. 1998) 
(granting State's motion to strike portions of Bredehoft's brief that relied upon his rule 
23B affidavit on the ground that rule 23B affidavits are not substantive evidence of 
ineffective assistance). 
Because the Court denied defendant's rule 23B motion, the record on appeal 
remains devoid of non-speculative evidence that trial counsel was ineffective for 
allegedly not examining the videotape of the traffic stop. Absent any evidence that the 
videotape was exculpatory, and that trial counsel did not examine it, this Court must 
presume that trial counsel acted effectively. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 17. "This 
presumption is consistent with the fundamental policies" undergirding ineffective 
assistance jurisprudence, that "'courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,'" id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), "and with the general rule that record inadequacies result in 
an assumption of regularity on appeal." Id. (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1226 (Utah 1997)). Defendant's wholly speculative claim of ineffectiveness thus fails as 
a matter of law. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's felony convictions for possession of dangerous weapons, drugs, and 
paraphernalia should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _?_ June 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
IAN DECKI 
Assistant Attorney General 
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98 North 400 East 
PO Box 955 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-1542 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, RULE 23B MOTION 
Plaintiff/Appelleet, 
vs. Appellate No: 20060737 
RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ, Trial Ct. No: 0061700024 
Defendant/Appellant. 
[RELIEF SOUGHT]: Defendant/Appellant, Raymond Marquez, moves this 
Court to remand this case in accordance with rule 23 B of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure for findings by the district court necessary to determine whether Defendant's 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. 
[GROUNDS:] 
1. This motion is filed prior to filing Appellant's brief. 
2. In pretrial discovery, Defendant's trial attorney submitted a formal discovery 
request for copies of all relevant information that might be used in prosecuting the case. 
See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at \ 3. 
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3. Before trial, the State failed to provide a copy of the videotape from the 
Highway Patrol dash camera of the traffic stop giving rise to Defendant's charges. See 
Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey. 
4. The morning of trial, trial counsel was informed by the prosecutor that a 
videotape existed but that it was not in the possession of the prosecutor and could not, 
therefore, be provided or viewed prior to trial. See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at % 6. 
5. Trial counsel and the prosecutor agreed to proceed with trial without viewing 
the videotape but agreed to inform the judge, on the record, that the tape existed but had 
not been provided prior to trial. See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at f 7. 
6. During trial, trial counsel did not make a record of the nondisclosure of the tape 
and the tape was not used by the prosecutor in presenting the State's case. See Affidavit 
of Samuel S.Bailey at f 8. 
7. Trial counsel has never viewed the tape to determine its usefulness to 
Defendant's case. See Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey at \ 9. 
[ARGUMENT]: 
Because Defendant raises a claim that trial counsel was ineffective, he bears the 
burden of assuring that the record is adequate. State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 98 (Utah 
2000). Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for temporary remand 
to the trial court to introduce evidence that might help prove an ineffectiveness of counsel 
claim and is directed at providing crucial factual information that is absent from the 
record. State v. Johnston, 13 P.3d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2000); UTAH R. APP. P. 23B. 
Rule 23 B requires that Defendant allege nonspeculative facts, not fully appearing 
in the record on appeal which, if true, could support a determination that counsel was 
ineffective. UTAH R. APP. P. 23B(a) (West 2007). Further, the facts in the supporting 
affidavits must show the prejudice claimed to be suffered by Defendant by the claimed 
deficient performance of counsel. /Jat(b). 
In this case, trial counsel has stated that he did not receive evidence from the 
County Attorney that was clearly relevant to the case and still has not reviewed the 
evidence. Because of the nature of the evidence— a videotape of the interaction between 
Defendant and law enforcement— it is important to compare the videotape with the 
testimony that was provided at trial. Additionally, the videotape may contain exculpatory 
information that was important to the investigation and presentation of Defendants' case. 
The videotape is important to determine if trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
complete a full investigation prior to trial and in failing to request a trial delay until he 
had the opportunity to review the evidence with Defendant and determine its possible 
usefulness to Defendant's case. Furthermore, appellate counsel needs to fully review and 
make a record of the videotape in anticipation of an Anders-style brief. 
The contents of that videotape and the facts set forth in the Affidavit of Samuel S. 
Bailey do not appear in the available record and could support a determination that 
counsel was ineffective. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this matter be remanded to the District 
Court for hearing regarding the claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel relative to 
the videotaped traffic stop in this case. 
DATED this ^ d a y of February, 2007. 
Don M. Torgprson 
Attorney forT)efendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On February 2007,1 served the attached Rule 23B Motion on all interested parties 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
By Hand 
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By Facsimile Transmission 
Court of Appeals (Original + 4 Copies) 
P.O. Box 140230 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City Utah 84114 
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Don M. Torgerson # 10318 
TORGERSON LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
220 East 200 South 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-1542 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, AFFIDAVIT OF SAMUEL S. 
Plaintiff/Appellee, BAILEY 
vs. 
Appellate No: 20060737 
RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. Trial Ct. No: 0061700024 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNT OF CARBON ) 
Samuel S. Bailey, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I was the trial attorney for Defendant, Raymond Charles Marquez, in this 
action. 
2. The matters stated in this affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge, 
would be admissible in evidence, and I am competent to testify to the matters stated 
herein. 
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3. As Defendant's attorney, I requested discovery of relevant information from 
the State on March 14, 2006, including videotapes and audio tapes that would be used in 
the prosecution of the matter. 
4. On March 20, 2006,1 received copies of all police reports from the State. 
5. I did not receive any videotapes or audio tapes from the State relating to 
this matter. 
6. On the morning of trial, I was advised by Gene Strate, the Prosecuting 
Attorney, that a videotape of the traffic stop existed but had not been provided to the 
County Attorney's office by the Utah Highway Patrol. 
7. Mr. Strate and I agreed that trial would proceed without the videotape but 
that we would advise the Court that the tape existed and that I had not been provided a 
copy of the tape in pretrial discovery. 
8. We did not make a record regarding the videotape and the videotape was 
not used by Mr. Strate in prosecuting the matter. 
9. I have never viewed the videotape and I have not received a copy of the 
videotape from the State. 
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DATED this Z^day of February, 2007. 
By: 
Safnue-i-^ r Bailey 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 3$~ day of February, 2007. 
Notary Publi 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On February 2007,1 served the attached Affidavit of Samuel S. Bailey on all 
interested parties to this action as follows; 
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Appeals Division 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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Don M. Torgerson #10318 
TORGERSON LAW OFFICES, P-C-
98 North 400 East 
PO Box 955 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-1542 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, RULE 23B ORDER 
Plaintiff/Appelleet, 
vs. Appellate No: 20060737 
RAYMOND CHARLES MARQUEZ, Trial Ct No: 0061700024 
Defendant/Appellant. 
This matter came before the Court in accordance with Defendant/Appellant's Rule 
23B Motion. Defendant asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because 
trial counsel did not receive notice of a videotaped traffic stop until the morning of trial 
and trial counsel proceeded to trial without reviewing the videotape. 
IT IS ORDERED that this matter is remanded to the District Court to determine if 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance to Defendant at trial. On remand, the District 
Court shall receive evidence and make factual findings within 90 days of this Order to 
determine if trial counsel provided ineffective assistance to Defendant relative to the 
nondisclosed videotape in this case. 
DATED this day of. _, 2007. 
By: 
Appellate Judge 
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Utah Attorney General (1 Copy) 
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S t a t e of Utah , 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Raymond Charles Marquez, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER DENYING REMAND 
Case No. 20060737-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne. 
This is before the court on a motion for remand under rule 
23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is 
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not 
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could 
support a determination that counsel was ineffective," including 
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance" and "the 
claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the 
claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B (a), (b) . 
Marquez has failed to show any prejudice from trial 
counsel's failure to view the videotape. Marquez asserts that 
the tape may have exculpatory value, but that assertion is merely 
speculative. There is nothing indicating what, in fact, the tape 
shows. It may support the officer's testimony of the encounter. 
Absent facts that suggest prejudice, a remand is not warranted. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion is denied. 
Dated this <^3- day of March, 2007. 
FOR THE COURT: 
^ ^ 7 U ^ 
W i l l i a m A. Thorne J r . , J u d g e 
fcU' 
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